Animal spirits and credit cycles by de Grauwe, Paul & Macchiarelli, Corrado
  
Paul de Grauwe and Corrado Macchiarelli   
Animal spirits and credit cycles 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: de Grauwe, Paul and Macchiarelli, Corrado (2015) Animal spirits and credit cycles. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 59 . pp. 95-117. ISSN 0165-1889  
 
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2015.07.003 
 
Reuse of this item is permitted through licensing under the Creative Commons: 
 
© 2015 The Authors 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63984/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 1 
Animal spirits and credit cycles 
 
Paul De Grauwe
1
  Corrado Macchiarelli
1,2
 
 
 
 In this paper we extend the behavioural macroeconomic model as proposed by De Grauwe 
(2012) to include a banking sector. The behavioural model takes the view that agents have 
limited cognitive abilities. As a result, it is “rational” to use simple forecasting rules and to 
subject the use of these rules to a fitness test. Agents are then driven to select the rule that 
performs best. The behavioural model produces endogenous and self-fulfilling movements of 
optimism and pessimism (animal spirits). Our main result is that the existence of banks 
intensifies these movements, creating a greater scope for booms and busts. Thus, banks do not 
create but amplify animal spirits. We find that increases in the equity ratios of banks tend to 
reduce the importance of animal spirits over the business cycle. The other policy conclusion we 
derive from our results is that the central bank has an important responsibility for stabilising 
output: output stabilization is an instrument to “tame the animal spirits”. This has the effect of 
improving the trade-off between inflation and output volatility.  
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1  Introduction 
Since the start of the financial crisis DSGE modelers have hurriedly attempted to introduce a 
banking sector into their models. This has been done in the framework of models that assume 
rational expectations, i.e. that assume that the representative agent understands the complexity 
of the underlying model. If there is anything we have learned from the financial crisis it is that 
this crisis was made possible by the fact that agents do not understand the complexity of the 
world in which they live. Instead, their cognitive abilities are very limited. Therefore there is a 
need to introduce a banking sector in models that recognize the cognitive limitations of agents. 
While recent contributions have explored the need to introduce banking in an agent based 
simulation framework (e.g., Ashraf, Gershman and Howitt, 2011; Delli Gatti et al., 2008), no 
attempts have been made to introduce bounded rationality and rule switching behaviour in a 
macro model that preserves the spirit of the original “financial accellerator approach” of Blinder 
and Bernanke (1998) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). This is what we attempt to do 
in this paper. 
Economists have long recognized the role of expectations’ formation. This has been mainly in 
the light of evidence from experimental studies supporting the idea of information processing 
with agents’ limited cognitive abilities. Recent contributions, including Carroll (2003), Mankiw, 
Reis and Wolfers (2004), Branch (2004, 2007) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) provide empirical 
evidence in favour of agents’ heterogeneity using survey data on inflation expectations. 
Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) point to the idea of agents possibly using structurally different 
learning rules. In the same vein, Frankel and Froot (1990), Bloomfield and Hales (2002),  
Branch (2004), Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra and van de Velden (2005), Pfajfar and Zakelj 
(2010), Assenza, Heemeijer, Hommes, and Massaro (2013), and Hommes (2011), find evidence 
in favour of heterogeneity in learning to forecast, conditional on recent forecasting performance, 
using both survey and laboratory data. Despite this evidence, the dynamic effects of 
expectations’ heterogeneity has been explored only recently in macro models (for a survey, see 
Milani, 2012), and even less so in models with a banking sector (e.g., Ashraf, Gershman and 
Howitt, 2011; Delli Gatti et al., 2008).  
Much of the previous attempts to model expectations that deviate from rational expectations 
have tried to stay as close as possible to the rational expectations’ assumption. In these types of 
models, expectations of agents are assumed to satisfy a number of intuitive properties, including 
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linearity and the law of iterated expectations (LIE). These include studies focusing on 
alternative forms of information processing, such as learning (Sargent, 1994; Evans and 
Honkaphoja, 1999, 2001; Milani, 2007), rational inattention (Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2005; 
Sims 2005; Ball et al. 2005; Schorfheide, 2005); “sticky information” (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; 
Levine et al., 2012; and Trabandt, 2007; Mankiw and Reis, 2007; Reis 2009 in the DSGE 
literature) or bounded rationality at large (Sargent, 1994). All such models ask whether agents 
would converge to the same rational expectation equilibrium if they started with a more limited 
degree of knowledge or they were allowed to learn over time (for a discussion see Milani, 2012; 
Cornea, Hommes and Massaro, 2012; Massaro, 2013).
3
 These types of approaches generally 
produce sunspot-equilibria or multiple steady states (see Howitt and McAfee, 1992; Evans et al., 
1998; and Evans and Honkapohja, 1999, 2001; Clarida et al., 2000), overall improving the 
endogenous propagation of shocks, and hence model fit. Overall, however, as remarked 
previously, in the majority of cases such models have to tradeoff between rational and bounded-
rational agents.  
Following Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), in this paper we treat the realization of economic 
choices as being an interactive process between different types of agents. In particular, 
following De Grauwe (2008a,b, 2011, 2012), our model includes two types of agents. The first 
type are fundamentalists, who forecast output and inflation based on their equilibrium value. 
The second type use the simplest backward-looking rule of thumb – i.e., their forecast coincides 
with the last available observation – to forecast future the output gap and inflation. De Grauwe 
(2008a,b, 2011, 2012) is not the only one to model heterogenous expectations in a New 
Keynesian Model (NKM). Recent examples of expectations’ heterogeneity in a NK framework 
include Branch and McGough (2009) and Levine et al. (2012). In particular, Branch and 
McGough (2009) introduce heterogeneous expectations into a New Keynesian framework where 
the forward looking term in a New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is a convex combination 
of backward- and forward-looking behaviors. The authors show that a microfounded NKM 
under bounded rationality can be obtained if specific axioms within the optimizing behavior of 
households and firms are considered, implying the law of iterated expactations (LIE). These 
axioms ensure the ability of agents to forecast the output gap and inflation at the micro level as 
                                                     
3 Rationality would then not be achieved immediately either because of the existence of explicit costs in acquiring all 
information in the economy (i.e. full rationality implies agents already have full knowledge about the structure of the economy), 
or because agents are assumed to update their information only with some probability in each period. 
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well as aggregation at the macro level. Overall, however, such an approach, while making an 
important contribution to bridge aggregate forecasting rules with micro derivation, still strives to 
keep the benchmark rational expectations valid.  
De Grauwe’s approach is instead a more “radical” departure (Milani, 2009) from the previous 
literature (e.g. Branch and McGough, 2009), as no agent in the economy is assumed to have 
rational expectations. No agent in this economy posseses sufficient cognitive skills to 
understand the complexity of the underlying model and to know the distribution of the 
exogenous shocks hitting the economy. Rationality in this model is introduced instead by 
assuming agents are willing to learn from their mistakes. Thus, the concept of rationality used in 
De Grauwe (2008a,b, 2011, 2012), and followed by this paper, is consistent with the idea that 
agents are aware of the fact that their beliefs are biased, but they are willing to learn from the 
past. In this set up, the heuristic behaviour employed in the formation of expectations is more 
“drastic” than the one employed by the standard bounded rationality literature in the sense that 
rational expectation equilibria are not nested by the model.
4
  
We believe the assumption of individuals having cognitive limitations – leading them to use 
simple rules that do not take all the available information into account – is necessary once we 
take the view that agents are limited in their capacity to collect and process the immense 
information set that is present in the world. In our opinion, this evolutionary rationality is a 
better way to describe rationality in a world that is too complex and uncertain for agents to 
understand. 
 
2  The model 
In this section we first present the baseline behavioral macroeconomic model proposed by De 
Grauwe (2008a,b, 2012). We then go a step further by decomposing aggregate demand into 
consumption and investment demand. Finally banks are introduced. 
 
2.1 The baseline behavioral macro model (BMM) 
Our baseline behavioral macroeconomic model (BMM) consists of three equations. An 
                                                     
4 The model presented in De Grauwe (2008a,b, 2011, 2012) thus differs from multiple equilibria models in that it does not rely 
on extraneous “sunspots.” The economic fluctuations are driven instead by the intrinsic random shocks of the model. This is 
similar to Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 14), but differ from the latter in that it does not have multiple equilibria under 
rational expectations. 
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aggregate demand (AD) function:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎1?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑎1
′ )𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎2(𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,    (𝑎2 < 0) (1) 
an aggregate supply (AS):  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑏1?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑏1)𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑦𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 , (2) 
and a Taylor rule (TR):  
𝑟𝑡 = 𝑐1(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
∗) + 𝑐2𝑦𝑡 + 𝑐3𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡.  (3) 
In the equations above, 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap, 𝑟𝑡 the nominal interest rate, πt is inflation and 𝜀𝑡 is 
a white noise disturbance term. Note that (𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) is the real interest rate, where ?̃?𝑡 (. ) is 
the expectation operator, which is different from the standard “rational expectation” term where 
the representative consumer is assumed to forecast using all the information available. As 
explained in De Grauwe (2008a,b, 2012), there is no direct derivation of the model at the 
microeconomic level, albeit equations (1) to (3) are consistent with the log-linearized version of 
most New Keynesian models. The baseline model, based on Smets and Wouters (2007), shows 
how the AD is equivalent in fact to log-linearizing the Euler equation for consumer 
optimization, to which a smoothing term is added (see for instance Woodford 2003). Given the 
sign restrictions posited, the aggregate demand equation has a very straightforward 
interpretation. Utility maximizing agents will want to spend more on goods and services today 
when they expect future income to increase, and to spend less when the real interest rate 
increases (De Grauwe, 2012).  
Conversely, the aggreagate supply in eq. (2) is the pure forward looking New Keynesian version 
of the AS based on Calvo-pricing (see for instance, Clarida et al. 1999; Woodford, 2003; De 
Grauwe, 2012) when 𝑏1 = 1 (Branch and McGaugh, 2009). As before, this equation can be 
obtained by log-linearization around the steady state. With 0 < 𝑏1 < 1 the relation incorporates 
an inertial term in the vein of Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford 
(2003).  
Finally, the Taylor rule describes the behavior of the central bank, with 𝜋𝑡
∗ being the inflation 
target. Based on TR, the central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate, 𝑟𝑡, when the observed 
inflation rate increases relative to the announced inflation target. The extent to which the central 
bank reacts to inflation depends on the coefficient 𝑐1. Similarly, when the output gap increases, 
the central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate. The intensity with which it does so depends 
on the coefficient 𝑐2. Finally, the central bank is assumed to smooth the interest rate. This 
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smoothing behavior is represented by the lagged interest rate in eq. (3). 
Under rational expectations, the forward-looking terms, which are the expectations of the output 
gap and inflation respectively at time 𝑡 +  1 would be given by ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 and ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 =
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1. As discussed before, in this paper we depart from rational expectations by considering 
instead the behaviorial approach of De Grauwe (2011, 2012). In this set up, expectations are a 
convex combination of the available heterogeneous expectation operators. The selection of the 
forecasting rules depends on the forecast performance of the different rules given by a publicly 
available fitness measure, which is updated in every period. For each variable we reduce the 
problem to a binary forecast choice (Brock and Hommes, 1997, 1998). After the equilibrium is 
revealed, forecasts are evaluated ex post according to the publicly available fitness measure and 
new fractions are determined. These updated fractions are used to determine the next period 
output gap and inflation and so on. Agents’ rationality thus consists in choosing the predictor 
that performs better based on its past performance.    
We now explain the selection mechanism in detail. Agents are supposed to forecast the output 
gap (𝑦) and inflation (𝜋) using two alternative forecasting rules. In the first one, (fundamentalist 
rule),  agents are assumed to use the steady-state value of the output gap, 𝑦∗, here normalized to 
zero, to make a forecast. In the second one (called extrapolative rule), agents extrapolate the 
output gap’s past observation. Analogously for inflation, agents are assumed to switch between 
a fundamentalist and an extrapolative rule. In an environment where the central bank explicitly 
announces its inflation target, inflation fundamentalists are assumed to base their expectations 
on the central bank’s target, 𝜋∗. By contrast, inflation extrapolators behave exactly as output 
gap’s extrapolators do: by naively forecasting inflation based – each time – on inflation’s latest 
available observation.  
Market forecasts of output gap and inflation are obtained as a weighted average of each 
respective forecasting rule (for each variable 𝑦, 𝜋). In what follows we illustrate the behavioural 
rules for the output gap (𝑦). A similar notation can be used for inflation (𝜋). Convex 
combinations of the two forecasting rules are determined as: 
 ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑓,𝑡?̃?𝑡
𝑓𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝛼𝑒,𝑡?̃?𝑡
𝑒𝑦𝑡+1, (4) 
where the fundamentalist rule ?̃?𝑡
𝑓𝑦𝑡+1 is defined as  
 ?̃?𝑡
𝑓𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝑦
∗, 
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and the extrapolative ?̃?𝑡
𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 rule is 
 ?̃?𝑡
𝑒𝑦𝑡+1 = θ𝑦𝑡−1. 
The latter is a form of adaptive or extrapolative expectations. Adaptive expectations of this kind 
have been used by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), Branch (2002), Branch and McGough 
(2009), and Pesaran (1987). When  𝜃 = 1 the operator is usually called “naïve”. For  𝜃 < 1 
expectations are instead adaptive, whereas for 𝜃 > 1 expectations are said to be “extrapolative” 
(see Brock and Hommes, 1998). To keep the model tractable, in the paper we assume 𝜃 = 1, but 
refer to the latter as an extrapolative rule.  
In the model, we focus on the cyclical component of each variable, which makes the model 
symmetric with respect to zero (see, e.g., Harvey and Jaeger, 1993).
5
 In this environment, the 
equilibrium forecast for each variable will be constant over time and equal to each variable’s 
steady-state value. This is realistic in a stationary world, where, for instance, an inflation target 
of, e.g., zero would imply the central bank seeks to minimize deviations of the (realized) target 
rate of inflation from the corresponding time-varying equilibrium (steady-state) value. The same 
reasoning applies to output in deviation from its potential (i.e. the output gap).   
In eq. (4), the weights attached to each forecasting rule (𝛼𝑓,𝑡 for the fundamentalist rule and 𝛼𝑒,𝑡 
for the extrapolative rule) vary endogenously within the model. The reason for having different 
forecasting rules is supported by the empirical literature. For instance, Frankel and Froot (1990) 
find that professional market participants in the foreign exchange markets expect recent price 
changes to continue in the short term, while they expect mean reversion to the fundamental 
(steady state) value over the long term. Regarding the use of extrapolative rules, backward-
looking forecasting strategies, although extremely simple, may be useful particularly when the 
underlying stochastic process is a random walk. For instance, for a persistent process like 
inflation (or its gap) (see Cogley, 2002; Cogley and Sargent, 2007) , naive expectations can be a 
good predictor at times (see Cornea, Hommes and Massaro, 2013; De Grauwe, 2012). 
We base our forecasting rule mechanism on a dynamic predictor selection, in line with discrete 
choice theory. This mechanism allows switching between the two forecasting rules by 
computing the utility of the two rules and increase (decrease) the relative weight of one rule 
                                                     
5 For this reason, a non-negative interest rate constraint is not applied in the model: a negative interest rate in this economy 
should be understood as a negative interest rate gap (i.e. the interest rate in deviation from the natural rate of interest). Based on 
the model parameters, it is possible to infer the unconditional probability of a negative real interest rate gap (that is when 
expected inflation gap is higher than the nominal interest rate in deviation from the natural rate of interest). In line with standard 
predictions, a negative real interest rate stimulates the economy, i.e. the output gap will be positively affected.     
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against the other in each period. Under the formalization that the utilities of the two alternative 
rules have a deterministic and a random component – and assuming the latter to be logistically 
distributed (see Manski and McFadden, 1981; Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse, 1992) – the 
weights in eq. (4) can be defined based on each period utility (𝑈.,𝑡, see also De Grauwe, 2012).  
For the output gap, the corresponding weights take the form:  
 𝛼𝑓,𝑡
𝑦 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡
𝑦
)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡
𝑦
)+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡
𝑦
)
 
and  
 𝛼𝑒,𝑡
𝑦 = 1 − 𝛼𝑓,𝑡
𝑦 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡
𝑦
)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡
𝑦
)+𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡
𝑦
)
, 
Where each rule’s utility is determined by 
 𝑈𝑓,𝑡
𝑦 = −∑  ∞𝑘=0 𝑤𝑘[𝑦𝑡−𝑘−1 − ?̃?𝑡−𝑘−2
𝑓 𝑦𝑡−𝑘−1]
2
, 
and  
 𝑈𝑒,𝑡
𝑦 = −∑  ∞𝑘=0 𝑤𝑘[𝑦𝑡−𝑘−1 − ?̃?𝑡−𝑘−2
𝑒 𝑦𝑡−𝑘−1]
2. 
In the expression above, 𝑤𝑘 = (𝑝
𝑘(1 − 𝑝)) are geometrically declining weights (with 1 ≤ 𝑝 ≤
0), allowing to take into account the degree of forgetfulness in the model (see De Grauwe, 
2012). The parameter 𝛾 measures the “intensity of choice”. It parameterizes the extent to which 
the deterministic component of utility determines actual choice. When 𝛾 =  0 utility is purely 
stochastic. In that case agents decide to be fundamentalist or extrapolator by tossing a coin and 
the probability to be one or the other is exactly 0.5. When 𝛾 =  ∞ utility is fully deterministic 
and the probability of using one rule or the other is either 1 or 0. The parameter 𝛾 can also be 
interpreted as expressing the willingness to learn from past performance. When 𝛾 =  0 this 
willingness is zero; it increases with the size of  𝛾. 
From the utility maximization problem, it is clear that most agents will tend to choose the 
predictor that yielded higher utility over the past. Agents are thus “boundedly” rational in the 
sense that they use simple rules but subject these rules to a “fitness test”. The extent to which 
agents switch between rules depends on how well a given rule performs ex post relative to the 
other. In this sense agents learn from their mistakes. 
Importantly, this mechanism allows endogenizing the evolution of the distribution of 
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heterogeneous agents, with this proportion (𝛼𝑡) being estimated at each time.
6
 This is different 
from other approaches, e.g., Branch and McGough (2009), where weights are not endogenously 
esitmated by the model. As underlined by Cornea, Hommes and Massaro (2012) the empirical 
evidence does support the idea of changing the proportion of heterogeneous agents over time. 
Carroll (2003) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004), for instance, show that the distribution of 
heterogenous agents varies in reaction to economic volatility, whereas, Castle, Doornick and 
Hendry (2010) test for multiple structural breaks in inflation expectations in a NK Phillips curve 
framework. 
 
2.2  Decomposing the aggregate demand 
The aggregate demand described previously can be decomposed into consumption (𝑐) and 
investment (𝑖) sides of the economy: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡. (1') 
We specify the consumption and investment equations, respectively, as follows:  
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑑1𝑦𝑡 + 𝑑2?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑑1 − 𝑑2)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑑3(𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑣
𝑐
𝑡,    (𝑑3 < 0) (5) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒1?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝑒2(𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑣
𝑖
𝑡.    (𝑒2 < 0) (6) 
According to equation (1’), output 𝑦𝑡 is absorbed by consumption or investment. Public 
expenditure and taxation are absent in the model which ensures that income and output 
correspond in the consumption and investment equations.  
Consumption, 𝑐, depends on three factors. First, on current income, according to the parameter 
𝑑1 which represents the marginal propensity of consumption. Second, it depends on the 
expected future output gap, ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1. The latter term is equivalent to considering an exogenous 
level of private consumption even at level zero of income. Third, consumption depends on past 
income, introducing a habit formation mechanism which is assumed to slow down the 
adjustment of consumption to its optimal level after a shock (see also De Grauwe, 2008a,b, 
2012; Smets and Wouters, 2007). Finally, consumption depends negatively on the ex ante real 
interest rate (𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1), for 𝑑3 < 0.  
Following a standard approach, investment depends first on a forward looking component, the 
                                                     
6 While the ex-ante the probability of using each forecasting rule for each variable is 0.50, ex post this probability may vary. 
Matching those probabilities with empirical evidence from survey data is on our research agenda, but, for the moment, it 
remains beyond the scope of this analysis.  
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expected future output gap, ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1. Second, it negatively depends on the real interest rate, 
according to the parameter 𝑒2 < 0, which measures the sensitivity of investment to changes in 
the ex ante real interest rate.  
Substituting (5) and (6) into (1’) and comparing it with (1) yields the following cross-parameter 
restrictions: 𝑎1 =
𝑑2+𝑒1
1−𝑑1
 , 𝑎1
′ =
𝑑2
1−𝑑1
 , 𝑎2 =
𝑑3+𝑒2
1−𝑑1
  (with 0 < 𝑑1 < 1) and 𝑣
𝑐
𝑡 + 𝑣
𝑖
𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡. 
 
2.3  Introducing banks 
Banks are implicitly included in this model, since the interest rate is the price of credit. 
However, in order to account for banks explicitly, we introduce financial intermediaries which 
are assumed to collect money from savers (consumers) and lend it to borrowers (firms). The 
balance sheet of commercial banks accounts for loan supply (𝐿𝑆), on the asset side, and deposits 
(𝐷), on the liability side. Banks’ equity (𝑛𝑏) serves as an important cushion against unexpected 
losses. It is defined as the difference between assets and liabilities: 
 𝐿𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑛𝑡
𝑏 + 𝐷𝑡 . (7) 
For a commercial bank, the leverage is thus the ratio between its loans and equity. In this 
respect, banks are subject to an explicit capital-to-asset ratio, i.e.  
 
𝑛𝑡
𝑏
𝐿𝑡
𝑆 = 𝜅, (8) 
with 𝜅 being the equity ratio  (the inverse of banks’ leverage ratio). When a firm borrows money 
from a bank, it must pay an interest which normally exceeds the interest rates that savers receive 
for deposits. Hence, the cost of a loan from banks, 𝜌, is usually equal to the rate savers receive 
(here equal to the risk-free rate set by the central bank, 𝑟) plus a spread, 𝑥.  
 𝜌𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡. (9) 
The investment demand in equation (6) is hence replaced with equation (6’), assuming 
investment to depend on the cost of bank loans, as:  
 𝑖 = 𝑒1?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝑒2(𝜌𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1).    (𝑒2 < 0) (6') 
In this way, the spread is assumed to affect the overall investment decisions of firms directly.  
Incorporating banks into the aggregate demand – by means of eq. (1'), (5), (9) and (6') – gives: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎1?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝑎1
′ )𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎2(𝑟𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + (𝑎2 + 𝑎3)𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,    ((𝑎2 + 𝑎3) < 0) (1'') 
where 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are defined as before and 𝑎3 = −𝑑3/(1 − 𝑑1). This new aggregate demand 
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function in (1'') subsitutes the one in (1) or (1'), where banks are absent. Comparisons of eq. (1) 
and (1'') suggest that – while the aggregate demand still depends on future expected and past 
income and (negatively) on the real interest rate – it also depends on the spread, 𝑥𝑡 . Since the 
slope coefficient (𝑎2 + 𝑎3) is negative for 0 < 𝑑1 < 1 and 𝑒2 < 0, i.e. 𝑎2 + 𝑎3 =
𝑒2
1−𝑑1
, this new 
aggregate demand represents a negative relationship between 𝑦 and 𝑥.  
Bank lending further implies (stocks of) consumers’ savings to flow into deposits according to:  
 𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡−1 = 𝑠𝑡. (10) 
In the same vein, loan demand (𝐿𝐷) and investment are related by:  
 𝐿𝑡
𝐷 − 𝐿𝑡−1
𝐷 = 𝑖𝑡, (11) 
Thus we assume that savings take the form of an accumulation of bank deposits, and 
investments by firms are financed by bank loans only.  
Saving, s, is finally determined as: 
  𝑠𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 − 𝑣𝑡,  (12) 
as in the standard IS-LM set up. 
The next step in the analysis is to determine what the spread between the borrowing and the 
deposit rate is. We use the financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999). Defining 𝑛𝑓 as firms’ equity, we write: 
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜑𝑛𝑡
𝑓 ,    (𝜑 < 0) (13) 
An increase in the firms’ equity reduces the spread and viceversa. The underlying financial 
accelerator theory is the following. Banks have imperfect knowledge of the credit risk they take 
when granting a loan to a firm. To cover this credit risk they charge a spread (𝑥𝑡). When the 
value of equity of the firm increases this is interpreted by the bank as an improvement in the 
solvency of the firm. Thus, banks will perceive the credit risk to have declined allowing them to 
reduce the spread. A decline in the value of the firms equity has the opposite effect. Such a 
decline is interpreted as reducing the solvency of the firm and increasing the credit risk. Banks 
react by raising the spread.  
A firm with more debt than equity is leveraged. We define the leverage ratio, 𝜏 , as  
 𝜏 =
𝐿𝑡
𝐷
𝑛𝑡
𝑓 (14) 
To keep the model simple, it will be assumed here that firms keep the leverage ratio constant. 
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According to eq. (14), this implies that as the loan demand increases the firm will issue more 
equity in the same proportion (in Section 6 we will make firms’ leverage ratio endogenous).  
By putting together eq. (11) and (14), one realizes that the equity of firms depends on the 
inverse of firms’ leverage ratio (𝜏), which is the equity ratio, as  
 𝑛𝑓
𝑡 =
1
𝜏
(𝐿𝑡−1
𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡);   
e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
The spread clears the lending market determining the total level of loanable funds to firms. 
Here, loan demand (𝐿𝐷) is a function of investment, 𝐿𝑡
𝐷 = 𝐿𝐷(𝑖). Via eq. (7) loan supply (𝐿𝑆) is a 
function of banks’ equity and deposits, i.e. 𝐿𝑡
𝑆 = 𝐿𝑆(𝑛𝑏 , 𝐷), where bank equity is simply the 
difference between loans and deposits (subject to the contraint in eq. (8)). Via the banks’ 
balance sheet the market is cleared for 𝐿𝑆 = 𝐿𝐷. 
 
3  Solving the model 
We obtain a model with five endogenous variables, the output gap, inflation, the borrowing-
lending spread, savings and the interest rate. The first four are obtained after solving the 
following set of equations: 
  
[
 
 
 
1 −𝑏2 0                         0
−𝑎2𝑐1 1 − 𝑎2𝑐2 −(𝑎2 + 𝑎3)      0
−𝜑𝜏−1𝑒2𝑐1 −𝜑𝜏
−1𝑒2𝑐2 (1 − 𝜑𝜏
−1𝑒2)  0
𝑑3𝑐1 −(1 − 𝑑1 − 𝑑3𝑐2) 0                         1]
 
 
 
[
𝜋𝑡
𝑦𝑡
𝑥𝑡
𝑠𝑡
] = 
 =
[
𝑏1 0 0            0
−𝑎2 𝑎1 0            0
−𝜑𝜏−1𝑒2 𝜑𝜏
−1𝑒1 0            0
𝑑3 −𝑑2 0            0
  ]
[
 
 
 
 
?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1
?̃?𝑡𝑥𝑡+1
?̃?𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 ]
 
 
 
 
+ [
1 − 𝑏1 0 0            0
0 1 − 𝑎1
′ 0            0
0 0 0            0
0 −(1 − 𝑑1 − 𝑑2) 0            0
] [
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑦𝑡−1
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑠𝑡−1
] + 
  
 [
0 0 0
𝑎2𝑐3 0 0
𝜑𝜏−1𝑒2𝑐3 𝜑𝜏
−1 𝜑𝜏−1
𝑑3𝑐3 0 0
] [
𝑟𝑡−1
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡−1
𝑏
] + [
1
0
0
0
        
0
𝑎2
𝜑−1𝜏𝑒2
−𝑑3
        
0
1
0
−(1 − 𝑑1)
 ] [
𝜂𝑡
𝑢𝑡
𝜖𝑡
] 
In compact form, this is written as 𝐀𝐙𝐭 = 𝐁?̃?𝐭𝐙𝐭+𝟏 + 𝐂𝐙𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐃𝐗𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐄𝐯𝐭. As in De Grauwe 
(2008a,b, 2011, 2012), a solution for 𝐙𝐭 is obtained as 𝐙𝐭 = 𝐀
−𝟏(𝐁?̃?𝐭𝐙𝐭+𝟏 + 𝐂𝐙𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐃𝐗𝐭−𝟏 +
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𝐄𝐯𝐭) with the only condition being 𝐀 to be non-singular. Some comments are warranted in the 
next section. We obtain the value of the interest rate recursively by substituting output gap and 
inflation into the Taylor rule. Investments, equities and deposits are determined by the model 
solutions for inflation, the output gap, the spread and savings.
7
 
 
3.1  Model solution under rational expectations vs. “heuristics” 
The expectational term with a tilde superscript in the system of equations above implies that we 
do not impose rational expectations. By substitutitng the law of motion consistent with the 
heterogeneity of agents (extrapolators and fundamentalists discussed before), it can be shown 
that the endogenous variables depend linearly on lagged endogenous variables, their equilibrium 
forecasts, the usual predetermined variables and current exogenous shocks. In reduced form, the 
model is written as:  
𝐀𝐙𝐭 = 𝐅?̅? + 𝐆𝐙𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐃𝐗𝐭−𝟏 + 𝐄𝐯𝐭 
where ?̅? is a vector of constants, 𝐅 = 𝐁𝚮 , 𝐆 = 𝐁[𝐈 − 𝐇] + 𝐂, and H is a diagonal matrix, where 
the weights attached to each variable’s fundamentalist rule are on the main diagonal.  
In other words, under consideration of the heuristics for the forecasts regarding the output and 
inflation expectations, the forward looking term in eq. (2), (3), (5) and (6) is substituted by the 
equivalent expressions for the discrete choice mechanism given in Section 2.1. It can be gauged 
indeed that the model becomes purely backward-looking and it can be solved iteratively.  
In a standard rational expectation environment, the vector of variables multiplied by F would 
typically be 𝐄𝐭𝐗𝐭+𝟏 instead, thus bringing the problem to the same level of a rational 
expectations’ problem with predetermined variables. In the latter case, defining M as  
𝐌 = [
𝐅−𝟏𝐀 −𝐅−𝟏𝐆
𝐈𝟐 𝟎
] 
implies the model solution would require having to deal with determinacy, depending on the 
magnitude of the eigenvalues of M and the number of predetermined variables (see Blanchard 
and Khan, 1980).
8
 
Other than fully-departing from rational expectations, the specification adopted in this paper is 
indeed different from that of, e.g. Branch and McGough (2009), where a fraction of agents is 
                                                     
7 The spread and saving need not to be forecasted, as their forecasts do not enter the model. This does not affect the dynamics of 
the model (i.e. there is no structure of higher order beliefs in our framework; see Section 3.1).  
8 See also Binder and Pesaran (1996) and Evans and McGough (2005). 
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rational (forward-looking) and the remainder is adaptive (backward-looking); or that of Cornea, 
Hommes and Massaro (2012), which differ from the former in that it allows forward-looking 
agents not to have model-consistent expectations (rational) but to forcast according to a VAR 
present value model à la Campbell and Shiller (1987). In both cases, however, rational 
expectation represents the limiting case.
9
  
From a modelling point of view, keeping the rational expectation benchmark is not without 
difficulties. As underlined by Milani (2012) and De Grauwe (2011, 2012) in the benchmark 
New Keynesian model under rational expectations, the model fails to match the persistence of 
macroeconomic time-series. As a result, such a model is normally extended to include, in 
addition to several highly-autocorrelated exogenous shocks, other sources of endogenous inertia, 
such as habit formation, interest rate smoothing, sticky prices etc. (for a discussion see Milani, 
2012). In Section 8, we empirically discuss some of those issues.  
 
4  Calibration 
For the aggregate demand function we calibrate the parameters (𝑑1, 𝑑2, 𝑒1) to match standard 
macroeconomic simulation results, broadly consistent with De Grauwe (2011, 2012). This is to 
ensure comparability with the baseline macroeconomic model without a credit sector. A Table 
of coefficient is provided in Annex A. Overall, however, the parameters are calibrated consistent 
with the intervening literature. The new banking sector parameters are calibrated as follows: 𝑑1 
is computed to match a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of income equal to 0.5, in 
line with the empirical literature pointing to a MPC in the range of 0.2~0.7 (Friedman, 1963; 
Carroll, 2012; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010). The remaining parameters are derived consistently 
with the sign restrictions posited, namely a firms’ leverage factor of 𝜏 = 1.43, following 
Pesaran and Xu (2013) and 𝜑 < 0. For the latter, corresponding estimates are not available with 
                                                     
9 With respect to our approach, a methodological issue clearly arises. The forecasting rules (heuristics) introduced here are not 
derived at the micro level and then aggregated. Instead, they are imposed ex post. As stressed in De Grauwe (2011), however, 
this has also been the approach in the learning literature pioneered by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Ideally, one would like to 
derive the heuristics from the micro-level in an environment in which agents experience cognitive problems. Branch and 
McGough (2009) propose an approach where a given number of axioms are needed for aggregation. In particular, the axioms 
imposed in Branch and McGough impose regularity on the expectation operator and facilitate aggregation. As Branch and 
McGough emphasizes, their axioms restrict agents’ expectations so that they satisfy the LIE at both an individual and aggregate 
level. The LIE at the individual level is a reasonable assumption as it implies agents’ information set is constant over time. As 
the authors underline, however, the assumption of LIE at the aggregate level requires a particular structure on higher-order 
beliefs, which may be a too restrictive assumption in the presence of unanticipated structural breaks shifting or even changing 
the underlying distribution of e.g., output gap and inflation (see, e.g., The Hendry and Mizon, 2010). We thus do not make such 
an assumption here. 
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precision in the literature.
10
 Thus, we calibrate 𝜑 so that the spread displays the desirable 
propery of being always positive, and consistent with the historical average of the bank prime 
lending rate vs. 6-month Treasury bill spread, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), 
corresponding to an average of about 250 basis points (see Figure 1). Banks’ equity ratio (the 
inverse of the leverage ratio, 𝑘) is set equal to 0.09, consistent with the target parametrization in 
Gerali et al. (2010) and pretty much in line with the recent regulatory capital requirements for 
commercial banks.
11
  
The parameters that govern the selection mechanism across rules are calibrated as in De Grauwe 
(2011), again to ensure comparability (see Annex A), which is 𝛾 = 1 and 𝑝 = 0.5. De Grauwe 
(2011) also explores the sensitivity of the results by varying different key parameters in the 
switching mechanism, including the degree of forgetfullness in the model (𝑝) or the intensity of 
choice parameters in the Brock-Hommes function (𝛾). His results, showing  that numerical 
results are attained across different parameterization of the model, remain valid for our model as 
well.
12
  
Figure 1 – Bank prime loan rate vs. 6-month Treasury bill 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis Economic Data (FRED) 
 
5  Results 
5.1  Animal spirits drive the business cycles 
                                                     
10 For a discussion on steady state estimates for the spread see also Mehra, Piguillem and Prescott (2008), Curdia and Woodford 
(2010). 
11 Note that the (risk weighted) capital ratio in Basel III, comprising common equity and a capital conservation buffer, is equal 
to 7%. Basel III also assumes the possibility of a countercyclical buffer, which is imposed within a range of 0 – 2.5%, bringing 
the common equity standard to an interval of 7 – 9.5% (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  In section 6, we 
perform a sensitivity analysis by looking at the robustness of our results by varying banks’ optimal equity ratio in the interval 0 
– 18%. 
12 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Figures 2 and 3 show the time pattern of output gap and animal spirits produced by the baseline 
model with banks in a typical simulation run. We observe a strong cyclical movement in the 
output gap (Figure 2). The source of these cyclical movements is seen to be the index of animal 
spirits in the market (Figure 3). We define animal spirits as the fraction of agents who forecast a 
positive output gap. When this fraction is 1 all agents forecast such a positive output gap, i.e. 
they are all optimistic. When the fraction is zero all agents forecast a negative output gap; they 
are all pessimistic. The model creates endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism. These are 
highly correlated with movements in the output gap (0.91) (see also De Grauwe, 2008a,b, 2011, 
2012). During some periods, pessimism dominates and this translates into below average output 
growth. These pessimistic periods are followed by optimistic periods when optimistic forecasts 
tend to dominate, with above average growth. 
Figure 2 – Output gap
 
Figure 3 – Animal spirits 
 
In Figure 4 we present the frequency distribution of the output gap. It turns out that this 
distribution is not normal. It has fat tails (i.e. kurtosis is 3.84 and normality is rejected with p-
value 0.000 based on the Jarque-Bera test). Note that the stochastic shocks in the model are all 
i.i.d. thus the non-normality of the distribution of the output gap is generated by the model. This 
contrasts with standard linear DSGE models that are only able to produce non-normal 
movements in output by introducing non-normally distributed shocks (see also Section 8). The 
mechanism in our model that produces the non-normality is the interaction between animal 
spirits and output. As more and more agents become, say, optimists, they forecast positive 
output gaps. These forecasts are self-fulfilling and produce a boom, which tends to accelerate as 
more agents become optimists. The reverse happens when the downturn sets in.  
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We obtain more insight in this mechanism by plotting the frequency distribution of animal 
spirits in Figure 5. The latter is just a representation of the same animal spirits of Figure 3, but in 
the frequency domain. We observe that there is a concentration of observations at the extreme 
values of +1 (everybody is optimist) and 0 (everybody is pessimist). Thus, the dynamics of 
animal spirits are characterized by movements in optimism and pessimism, leading to “market 
frenzy” and large movements in economic activity.  
Figure 4 – Histogram output gap 
 
Figure 5 – Histogram animal spirits 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the spread in the time domain. The spread is negatively 
correlated with animal spirits (-0.087). The reason is that during an upturn of economic activity 
when agents are optimistic, the value of equity of firms increases, leading banks to lower the 
spread. The opposite occurs during a downturn. The correlation coefficient is low, however, 
Figure 6 – Borrowing-lending spread 
 
 
Figure 7 – Correlation output and animal 
spirits vs. banks’ capital requirement 
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suggesting that this effect is weak. The relatively low correlation coefficient has much to do 
with the fact that the banks cannot easily expand their balance having to obey to the balance 
sheet contraint in eq. (7), and being subject to an explicit capital requirement as set in eq. (8), in 
every period. 
To study the implications of changing regulatory capital requirements, we further vary the 
equity ratio 𝒌 (or, the inverse of banks’ leverage ratio) in the interval [0.0,0.18] and simulate the 
model over this range of different 𝒌s.13 From Figure 7 we observe that, as banks increase their 
equity ratio, the correlation between animal spirits and output gap does not decline significantly. 
This suggests that by raising the equity ratio of banks the authorities cannot significantly reduce 
the scope for animals spirits to lead to boom and busts in economic activity in this model. In a 
later section we discuss ways to make the banks’ balance sheets react to the state of the 
economy. 
 
5.2  Banks amplify animal spirits 
A key ingredient in our model is a pro-cyclical boom-bust cycle in credit, following a tightening 
or loosening of credit conditions. This amplifies waves of optimism and pessimism, which are 
themselves self-fulfilling, sowing the seeds of business cycles phases (Section 2.3).  
In this section we switch “on and off” the banking sector. This allows us to check the extent to 
which banks amplify animal spirits. We do this by varying the parameter 𝜑. The latter is a key 
parameter in the model: in fact, for 𝜑 = 0 there is no spread in the economy (i.e. borrowers and 
lenders will face the same risk free interest rate). This corresponds to the case where there is no 
banking sector. As 𝜑 increases (in absolute value), banks become more active and allow the 
spread to vary as a function of the firms’ equity.  
We vary 𝜑 in the interval 0 (i.e. no banking sector) to -0.2 to explore how the banks amplify the 
animal spirits. We report the pattern of animal spirits for different values of 𝜑 in Figure 8. The 
different lines in the graph are not explained by changes in the firms’ collateral value, but by the 
varying presence of banks in the model. This is indeed distinct from the leverage cycle literature 
(see also Section 6), which points out the amplifying effect of the interplay of the constraints 
faced by borrowers and lenders.  
We can see from Figure 8 that when banks are not present 𝜑 = 0, tail events (periods during 
                                                     
13 The model varies 𝑘 in steps of 0.03. For values larger than 0.96 (i.e. 𝑘 = 0. 99) the model becomes explosive. 
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which everyone is pessimist or optimist) are less likely. As soon as 𝜑 increases in absolute 
value, correlations in beliefs become more and more likely. Once again, this is only explained 
by varying the presence of banks in the model.  
Figure 8 – Animal spirits for different values of 𝜑s 
 
Figure 9 looks at the distribution of animal spirits in the frequency domain (the scale is the same 
through the different panels in Figure 9). Using different values of 𝜑, Figure 9 confirms how 
banks themselves amplify animal spirits. As 𝜑 increases we obtain a larger concentration of 
extreme optimism and pessimism.  
Figure 9 – Histogram of animal spirits for different values of 𝜑s 
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5.3  Effects of monetary policy shocks 
In this section, we analyse the impulse responses following an unanticipated increase in the 
interest rate. In Figure 10, the monetary policy shock occurs after 100 periods in the simulations 
to reduce the effect of starting values. The impulse responses to a temporary i.i.d. monetary 
policy shock are reported for output (impulse y), inflation (impulse p), investment (impulse i) 
and the spread (impulse x).  
Figure 10 – IRFs to monetary policy shock 
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We obtain the traditional results, i.e. output, investment and inflation decline following 
monetary policy tightening. The results also confirm the pro-cyclicality of credit. The interest 
rate induced decline in output and investment has the effect of reducing the equity of firms. As a 
result, their creditworthiness declines. This then induces banks to raise the spread. Thus, this 
effect is pro-cyclical, i.e. it tends to enhance the downturn initiated by the central bank’s 
increase in its interest rate.   
At this point the question would be: how much of these dynamics are explained by animal 
spirits? The mechanism described previously suggests that animal spirits make agents react to 
the state of the economy. Looking again at the IRFs, we evaluate how the model reacts to a 
monetary policy shock allowing for learning or not in the economy. Based on the model, 
allowing agents to learn in real time creates endogenous correlation in beliefs, hence animal 
spirits, as opposed to the case where agents are not allowed to learn.  
We carry out this exercise in two ways. We first simulate the model with a probability of 
shifting to each forecasting rule equal to 0.5. As discussed previously, fixing the probability at 
50% corresponds to the case where agents toss a coin (or 𝛾 =  0 in the Brock-Hommes’ 
function; see Section 2.1). Hence, there is no scope for animal spirits in the model, as the 
selection of the forecast rules in the model becomes completely stochastic.  
As an alternative parametrization, we use the ex post probabiliy of shifting among forecasting 
rules. This involves simulating the model in two steps. First we simulate the standard model 
without restrictions. In a second step, we take the the ex post probability, i.e. the probability 
observed after a simulation run, and use it to run the model a second time (step two). 
Importantly, in this way the probability of being fundamentalist or extrapolator is indeed fixed, 
but different from 0.5 (i.e. in this case it will be 𝛼𝑓,𝑡
𝑦 = 0.76 and 𝛼𝑓,𝑡
𝑝 = 0.57).14 Using a fixed 
probabily clearly reduces the correlation between output and animal spirits. In case a 50% 
probability is used, no animal spirits are allowed in the model. Hence, the correlation between 
output and animal spirits is virtually zero (-0.001). Using the probability ex post, the correlation 
between output and animal spirits drops to 0.72.  
For the sake of brevity, we report the impulse responses to a temporary i.i.d. monetary policy 
shock for output (e.g. impulse y) and inflation (e.g. impulse p) given the discussion above. The 
results of the standard model with heuristics (Figure 11, blue line) display a larger reaction 
                                                     
14 However measured, using a fixed probability makes the pattern of animal spirits become discrete. 
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compared to the case where the probability of switching between forecasting rules is fixed. Not 
allowing agents to learn dampens animal spirits. This is very much the case when we use a 50% 
probability (impulse y5). Using the probability ex post represents an intermediate step (impulse 
ypost), laying in between one extreme, where agents learn over time, and the other extreme, 
where the probability of using one rule against the other remains set at 50%, i.e. corresponding 
to agents tossing a coin. These results overall make clear how animal spirits actually play a 
crucial role in generating some of the key findings (e.g. in terms of model persistency and 
volatility) in this model. 
Figure 11 – IRFs to monetary policy shock with and without learning 
 
 
6  Leverage and stock prices 
6.1 The extended bank model 
In the previous sections we discussed how the balance sheet constraint implied banks could not 
lend more than they borrowed from households. Banks had no alternatives other than reduce 
credit availability during a boom, and viceversa. This pretty much fixed their balance sheets 
over the business cycle.  
In practice, however, there exist mechanisms that can lead banks to expand their balance sheets 
during booms and contract them during recessions, thereby amplifying business cycle 
movements. In this section we analyze one such mechanism. It will be based on the link 
between the firms’ asset values and the banks’ balance sheets and it is related to what the 
literature refers to as the leverage cycle (see Geanakoplos 1997, 2009). The leverage cycle 
normally requires that firms post collateral with the bank, and the bank has a balance sheet item 
called “posted collateral”. When, during a boom the asset prices of good firms go up (equity 
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increases), the firm's collateral constraint relaxes and its creditworthiness improves. During a 
downturn asset prices decline, and the firm's collateral constraint becomes more biting (for 
further discussion see Geanakoplos 1997, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Adrian and 
Shin, 2010). Based on such a leverage cycle, an amplification effect exists when incentives for 
both banks and firms to bear risk related to the provision of loans are affected. Essentially, a 
boost in asset and collateral values (together with the belief that the increase in asset values is 
sustainable; ECB, 2011; Mankiw and Ball, 2010) may lead both borrowers and firms to accept 
higher risk (i.e. "risk taking channel"), resulting in an excessive loan provision. This mechanism 
may easily come into play if admitting banks hold risky assets on their balance sheets, e.g. 
firms’ shares, and following a positive reevaluation of the profitability of these assets.  
In order to have asset price variability to contribute to the volatility in firms’ equity, we resort to 
the idea that firms’ market capitalization is equal to the number of (time-varying) shares (?̅?𝑡) 
multiplied by the current share price (𝑆𝑡), i.e.  
 𝑛𝑡
𝑓,𝑚 = ?̅?𝑡𝑆𝑡. (15) 
To derive share prices, we use the standard Gordon discounted dividend model,
15
.  
 𝑆𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡Λ̅𝑡+1
𝑅𝑡
𝑆 , (16) 
 with  
 𝑅𝑡
𝑆 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜉, (17) 
linking the asset price 𝑆𝑡 to expected future dividends (𝐸𝑡Λ̅𝑡+1) net of a discount rate 𝑅𝑡. The 
latter consists of the risk-free interest rate plus a constant equity premium (𝜉). We calibrate 𝜉 to 
be 5%, which is in line with the historical average market risk premium.  
The standard stable growth (Gordon) model assumes that dividends grow at a constant rate. The 
forecasts made by agents about future dividends follows the logic of the forecasts they make for 
the output gap. Agents assume the 1-period ahead forecast of dividends to be a fraction of 
nominal GDP one period ahead, whereas dividends are assumed to be constant thereafter (from 
𝑡 + 1 onwards). This forecast is reevaluated in every period. Since nominal GDP consists of a 
real and an inflation component, agents make a forecast of future output gap and inflation, in the 
same way as analyzed in Section 2. Thus, the forecasts are reevaluated in each period, and 
agents are willing to switch to another forecasting rule if this performs better than the one they 
                                                     
15 See e.g., Brealy and Myers (1984). 
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currently use. 
As before (equation 13), we assume that the spread is determined by the value of the firms’ 
equity. We substitute (15) into (13) to obtain   
 𝑥𝑡 = 𝜑?̅?𝑡𝑆𝑡,    (𝜑 < 0) (13') 
As a result, share prices, by affecting the firms’ financial positions, influence the spread. Given 
these additional dynamics in 𝑆, firms’ leverage in eq. (14) is no longer exogenous. It is defined 
by the new equation (14’) 
 𝜏𝑡 =
𝐿𝑡
𝐷
?̅?𝑡𝑆𝑡
  (14') 
Finally, the bank’s balance sheet is modified in a way that allows for asset prices to feed back 
on the bank’s balance sheet. In particular, it is assumed that banks own a fixed fraction, ?̅̅?, of 
firms’ shares.16  
 Tot. Assets (𝐴)  Liabilities (𝐵) 
Loans (𝐿𝑆)   Deposits (𝐷)  
Risky assets (?̅̅?𝑆)   Own equity (𝑛𝑏)  
 
In this way, the sum of total assets, 𝐴𝑡, to be considered in the banks’ balance sheet identity is 
simply: 
 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐿𝑡
𝑆 + ?̅̅?𝑆𝑡, (18) 
 and the new balance sheet constraint of the banks is given by the following, 
  𝐴𝑡 = 𝑛𝑡
𝑏 + 𝐷𝑡, (7') 
substituting equation (7). 
The link between asset prices and the banks’ balance sheets can now be described as follows. 
An increase in asset prices increases the available collateral, leading to a decrease in leverage on 
the part of the borrowers, and granting potential access to credit. Financial intermediaries, in 
turn, see the value of their assets increase and will then have incentives to expand lending. This 
then tends to bring down the spread. Thus, asset prices affect the aggregate demand (investment) 
via credit spread dynamics.
17
  
  
                                                     
16 Banks hold only a fixed fraction of firms’ shares, as making banks hold firms completely would otherwise erode incentives 
for banks to charge an excess premium over firms’ lending. 
17 This is different from De Grauwe (2008a, 2012, Chapter 7), where asset prices enter the aggregate demand directly.  
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6.2 Results with the extended banking model 
We simulated the extended model using the same calibration as in the simple model. The results 
of the simulations are shown in Figures 12 to 15 below.  
Figure  12 – Output gap
 
Figure  13 – Histogram output gap
 
Figure 14 – Animal spirits 
 
Figure 15 – Histogram animal spirits 
 
A comparison with the simulations obtained with the simple model of Section 2 leads to a 
number of interesting insights. First, in the extended model with endogenous asset prices we 
obtain longer waves of optimism and pessimism leading to larger movements in the output gap, 
compared to the model without endogenous asset prices. This can be seen from the time series 
results of the output gap and animal spirits in Fig. 12 and 13 compared to Fig. 2 and 4 (note the 
different scales in Fig. 12 and 13). The frequency distribution of the output gap exhibits fatter 
tails in the banking model with asset prices. Analogously, animal spirits and their frequency 
distribution (Figure 14 and 15) display more concentration of observations in the extremes of 
optimism and pessimism in the new model with endogenous asset prices.  
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To study the implications of changing regulatory capital requirements with the extended model, 
we again vary the equity ratio 𝑘 in the interval [0.0,0.18], as described previously. When asset 
prices are included (Fig. 17), the policy implications of varying banks’ capital requirements 
become much clearer. Importantly, the correlation between animal spirits and output gap is now 
downward sloping with increasing values of 𝑘. This is consistent with the “risk taking channel” 
idea. Thus, tightening banks’ capital requirements reduces the scope for banks to take risks, 
alleviating the effect of animal spirits over the business cycle. In particular, for 𝑘=0.15 the 
animal spirits vs. output’s correlation drop to nearly 0.1, compared to the case where 𝑘 is 9%. 
This suggests that the equity ratio is of use as a policy intrument when asset prices are included 
in the model.
18
  
Figure 16 – Borrowing-lending spread 
 
 
Figure 17 – Correlation output and animal 
spirits vs. banks’ capital requirement 
 
 
7.  Monetary Policy implications 
The existence of endogenous movements in optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) has 
important implications for monetary policy. The way we analyze these implications is by 
constructing tradeoffs between output and inflation variability. In standard DSGE-models these 
tradeoffs are always downward sloping. This means that in these models, any attempt to reduce 
output volatility by the use of the interest rate instrument comes at a price, i.e. more inflation 
                                                     
18 The extended banking model allows for an extra pass through from animal spirits to the banks’ balance sheet. By increasing 
banks’ leverage ratio we are simply reducing this pass-through forcing banks’ to take less risk. If we dampen animal spirits, for 
instance assuming agents toss a coin (i.e. the probability of using one forecasting rule or the other is fixed at 50%), the 
correlation between output and animal spirits would be virtually 0 most of the time (see Fig. A.1 and A.2 in the Annex) with no 
scope for tightening banks’ capital requirements. 
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volatility. Put differently, if the monetary authorities decide to increase their ambition to 
stabilize output fluctuations, they may be succesful in reducing output volatility, but this will be 
achieved by increasing inflation volatility.  
In our behavioral model we obtain a different result. In order to show this point we construct the 
tradeoffs between output and inflation volatility using the behavioral model with the simple 
banking sector. We do this by varying the output coefficient in the Taylor rule equation, 𝑐2, 
from 0 to 1 (keeping the inflation coefficient constant). For each value of 𝑐2 we simulate the 
model and compute the standard deviations of output and inflation. We plot these numbers in a 
figure with the standard deviation of inflation on the vertical axis and the standard deviation of 
output on the horizontal axis. We repeat this exercise for different inflation coefficients, so as to 
obtain one trade-off for every given inflation coefficient. The results are reported in Figure 18. 
The striking aspect of our results is that the tradeoffs we obtain are non-linear in nature. In order 
to understand the nature of this non-linear trade-off we start from point A on the tradeoff 
obtained when 𝑐1 = 1. Point A corresponds to the situation where the central bank sets 𝑐2 = 0, 
i.e. it does not attempt to stabilize output at all. If the central bank then starts increasing c2, we 
go down the tradeoff. This means that, for a given 𝑐1, increasing the output stabilization 
parameter reduces both output volatility (not surprising) and inflation volatility (surprising). 
Where does this effect come from? The answer is that by stabilizing output, the central bank 
helps in stabilizing animal spirits (waves of optimism and pessimism). The latter is a source of 
volatility not only of output but also of inflation. By “taming the animal spirits” the central bank 
reduces both inflation and output volatility. It follows that strict inflation targeting can never be 
optimal. 
There are limits to this “win-win” situation, however. The central bank can overdo its output 
stabilization effort. This is achieved where the tradeoff reaches the minimum point and becomes 
a negatively sloped line. We reach this point because too much output stabilization undermines 
the credibility of the inflation target.  
Inflation targeting remains important. We observe from Figure 18 that, by increasing 𝑐1, the 
tradeoff moves downwards. This means that, as the central bank follows a tighter inflation 
targeting policy rule, the tradeoffs improve. They remain non-linear though, which means that 
even in tighter inflation targeting regimes it pays to stabilize output. 
Figure 18 – Tradeoff output and inflation 
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8  Empirical issues 
In this section, we contrast the dynamics of a standard NK model both with heuristics and under 
rational expectations. For the sake of clarity, we focus on the case in which 𝜑 = 0, implying no 
asymmetry of information between lenders and borrowers, thus the standard three equation NK 
model. We further impose the following set of restrictions on the model parameters: 𝑏1 = 1 
(implying no backward looking term in the AS), 𝑐3 = 0 (implying no interest rate smoothing) 
and (𝑑1 + 𝑑2) =  1 (implying no habit in consumption, and hence in the AD function). The 
motivation for doing so is to show how the performance of a parsimonious model varies when 
assuming rational expectations, as opposed to the case in which heuristics are used. 
Having checked the model is determinate, the model under rational expectations is solved using 
the Binder and Pesaran procedure (1996). Otherwise, the behavioral rules set in Section 2 are 
employed when simulating the model with heuristics, and the model is solved iteratively (see 
Section 3.1). 
Confirming standard results, we find that the model under rational expectations is unable to 
reproduce persistency of the time series, nor is it capable of matching the observed third and 
fourth moments in time series data. The  rational expectations model is only capable of 
reproducing these features by slowing down the transmission of the shocks and that of the 
endogenous variables (by increasing the number of lags, i.e. relaxing the restrictions above on 
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𝑏1, 𝑐3 and 𝑑1 + 𝑑2). Conversely, the model with heuristics replicates the stylized facts better 
both in terms of autocorrelation and non-normality, even when “mechanical frictions” are 
absent. 
Table 1 
Autocorrelations 
 
No lags Heuristics NK (Smets and Wouters, 2003) 
Output gap  0.77 0.07 
Inflation 0.69 -0.02 
 
  
   Inertia 
  Output gap 0.89 0.79 
Inflation 0.90 0.61 
 
Without any source of inertia in the model, the standard NK model under rational expectations 
produces a series for the output gap with very little or almost no autocorrelation (0.07) (see 
Table 1), and whose distribution is normal (kurtosis: 2.9, i.e. normality is non-rejected with p-
value=0.5 based on the Jarque-Bera test). This is different from the model under heuristics 
where autocorrelated series and non-normality are attained, even though i.i.d. shocks are used 
and inertia terms are switched off. Looking at the top left section of Table 1, the output gap’s  
autocorrelation of the model with heuristics and no lags is 0.77. Normality is further rejected 
with p-value = 0.001 (kurtosis is 5.9) based on the Jarque-Bera test.
19
    
The possibility that imperfect information (departures from rational expectations) in NK models 
improves the empirical fit has also been documented by other recent contributions, including 
Collard and Dellas (2004, 2006) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2012). In particular, the latter 
consider learning in medium-scale DSGE models à la Smets and Wouters. They show that 
learning improves the fit of the model compared with the benchmark case of rational 
expectations. Along the same lines, Williams (2004), using simulation results, tests the effects 
of adaptive learning in benchmark RBC and New Keynesian models and compares the implied 
moments with those obtained under rational expectations. He shows that these effects are larger 
in the New Keynesian model compared to the standard RBC model. Finally, Jang and Sacht 
                                                     
19 The empirical autocorrelation of the US output gap is 0.96 (and kurtosis is 3.58) over the period 1960-2007. 
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(2012), estimating De Grauwe’s (2012) model using moment-based methods for the euro area 
data reach the same conclusions. In particular, the former authors confirm that a bounded 
rationality model with cognitive limitations provides a reasonable fit to auto and cross variance 
of the data series, compared to the model solution under rational expectations. 
One may argue that the comparison of the behavioural model with the stylized version of the 
Smets and Wouters (2003) model is not complete. DSGE-models have been extended in several 
dimensions, being able to generate longer waves of booms and busts. While this is true, we 
show here that even a parsimonious model with heuristics can account for the intrinsic 
persistence in the data and for the non-normality in the movements of the output gap, a feature 
equally parsimonious models with rational expectations are unable to do.  
Finally, one may ask why one should not take an “off the shelf” model with banking and simply 
introduce heuristics, so to as be able to compare the results under the rational expectation 
benchmark. First, it should be noted that our model is consistent with many reduced-form 
models available in the literature.
20
 In addition, taking an existing reduced-form DSGE model 
with banking and simply introducing heuristics would anyway imply expectation mechanisms to 
be imposed ex post on a reduced system of equations which themselves have been derived from 
maximizing behaviour under the assumption of rational expectations. This would have to be the 
case, unless axioms maintaining the rational expectation hypothesis at the aggregate level (e.g., 
Branch and McGough, 2009) are imposed. While we understand this represents an important 
venture for further research (and it is on our research agenda to investigate all such issues 
thoroughly), it goes beyond the scope of this article.  
 
9  Conclusion 
In this paper we have extended the behavioral macroeconomic model of De Grauwe (2012) to 
include a banking sector. The behavioral model takes the view that agents have limited 
congitive limitations. As a result, it is rational to use simple forecasting rules and to subject the 
use of these rules to a fitness test. Agents are then driven to select the rule that performs best. 
We believe that this is the proper way to define rationality in a world were agents do not 
understand the complexity of the world itself. It is also in this framework that the banking sector 
                                                     
20 See also footnote number 9. 
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is introduced. 
Our behavioral model produces endogenous and self-fulfilling movements of optimism and 
pessimism (animal spirits). Our main result is that the existence of banks intensifies these 
movements, creating a greater scope for booms and busts. Thus, banks do not create but amplify 
animal spirits. During booms, the equity of firms increases in value. This is a signal for the 
banks that the credit risk of firms declines. As a result, they are willing to lower the interest rate 
spread they charge on loans. The opposite occurs during a recession. Thus, credit works 
procyclically and intensifies the volatility of output. In the light of this we find that the equity 
ratio of banks can be used as a policy instrument, i.e. by raising the equity ratio of banks, the 
amplification effect that is produced by the banking sector is reduced and and as a result the 
influence of animal spirits on economic activity is weakened, reducing  the intensity of booms 
and busts in economic activity. 
The other policy conclusion we derive from our results is that the central bank has an important 
responsibility for stabilising output. Output stabilization is an instrument to “tame the animal 
spirits”. This has the effect of improving the tradeoff between inflation and output volatility.  
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Appendix A 
Calibrated parameters in the model 
𝛾 =  1.0           switching parameter in Brock Hommes 
𝜋∗ =  0.0        the central bank's inflation target 
𝑑1 =  0.5                    marginal propensity of consumption out of income 
𝑒1  =  0.1                    coefficient on expected y in investment eq.  
𝑑2 =  (0.5) ∗ (1 − 𝑑1) − 𝑒1        coefficient on expected y in consumption eq. to match 𝑎1  =  0.5  
𝑑3 =  −0.01                  coefficient on real rate in consumption eq.  
𝑒2  =  (−0.5) ∗ (1 − 𝑑1) − 𝑑3       coefficient on real rate in investment eq. to match 𝑎2  =  −0.5 
  𝑎1  =  (𝑒1 + 𝑑2)/(1 − 𝑑1)     coefficient of expected output in output equation 
𝑎1
′  =  𝑑2/(1 − 𝑑1)          coefficient of lagged output in output equation 
𝑎2  =  (𝑑3 + 𝑒2)/(1 − 𝑑1)     interest elasticity of output demand 
𝑎3  =  −𝑑3/(1 − 𝑑1)         coefficient on spread term in output eq. 
  𝑏1  =  0.5         coefficient of expected inflation in inflation equation 
𝑏2  =  0.05        coefficient of output in inflation equation 
𝑐1  =  1.5         coefficient of inflation in Taylor equation 
𝜑 =  −0.02      parameter on firm equity  
𝜏 =  1.43       firms' leverage (i.e. Pesaran and Xu, 2013) 
𝑘 =  0.09         banks' inverse leverage ratio (Gerali et al., 2010) 
  𝑒 =  0.05          equity premium 
𝛼 =  0.2       fraction of nominal GDP forecast in expected future dividends  
?̿?  =  40           number of shares in banks' balances sheets 
𝑛 ̅ =  60            initial value for number of firms' shares  
  𝑐2  =  0.5         coefficient of output in Taylor equation 
𝑐3  =  0.5         interest smoothing parameter in Taylor equation 
  𝜎1  =  0.5      standard deviation shocks output eq. 
𝜎2  =  0.5      standard deviation shocks inflation eq. 
𝜎3  =  0.5      standard deviation shocks Taylor eq. 
  𝑝 = 0.5          speed of declining weights in mean squares errors (memory) 
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Figure A.1 – Histogram animal spirits with 
agents tossing a coin 
 
Figure A.2 – Correlation output and animal 
spirits vs. banks’ capital requirements with 
agents tossing a coin 
   
   
 
